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THE DUTY TO SETTLE IN WTO DISPUTE 
SETTLEMENT 
Chios Carmody 
ABSTRACT 
WTO disputes form an important part of the way we think 
about WTO law today. Nevertheless, given the fact that virtually all 
of the disputes must, at some point or other, settle, this article 
argues that an important — and perhaps even pre-eminent — 
aspect of WTO law is the law of settlement. There is an actual duty 
on parties in WTO law to resolve the cases they are involved in. 
This is not a “hard” obligation in the sense of having to achieve a 
specific result, but rather one of a softer, process-oriented variety. 
This article examines the law of negotiation and settlement in 
domestic labour law and Aboriginal law as a prelude to examining 
the extent of this duty as developed in U.S. – Shrimp and U.S. – 
Continued Suspension. 
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 I. INTRODUCTION 
Thinking about WTO law today is dominated by WTO dispute 
settlement. Since the WTO’s system of dispute settlement was first 
activated 15 years ago the system has rendered over 300 decisions, appeals 
and arbitration awards. These have provided both the dispute settlement 
system and commentators with an illuminating source of jurisprudence on 
many key points of WTO law.  
At the same time, the spectacle of WTO dispute settlement has 
provided the global public with imagery akin to that of private litigation. 
Dispute settlement features identifiable “claimants” and “defendants”, rules 
of procedure, requirements of evidence, written decisions, appeals, and 
perhaps most importantly, remedies, or trade “sanctions”, that infer the 
legal system actually has “teeth”. Taken together, these elements infer that 
what the dispute settlement system has created is a trade “court”, and 
indeed, WTO dispute settlement has been popularly described as such.1 
The paradigm of litigation casts a long shadow on thinking about WTO 
law at present. There is an implicit emphasis on the law’s tactical and 
polemical aspects. Virtually every report begins with ritual references to 
the standard of review, the burden of proof and treaty interpretation.2 
This emphasis on litigation and adversarialism — on “dispute 
settlement” — is at odds with another, less noted, aspect of WTO law — 
that of “dispute settlement”, the duty on WTO member countries to 
cooperate in resolving their differences. 3  This duty announces itself in 
general terms in DSU Article 3.10, which requires that countries “engage in 
dispute settlement procedures in good faith in an effort to resolve the 
dispute.” Indeed, I will argue in this article that the objective of resolving 
disputes is conceptually primate in the treaty and subsists throughout the 
entire course of WTO litigation. As the arbitrator in U.S. – 1916 Act (22.6) 
observed, “this obligation [to resolve disputes] applies to all stages of the 
dispute, including during the implementation of the suspension of 
obligations.”4 Thus, the popular polemical image of WTO law is matched 
                                                 
1 For instance, see Global Exchange, The WTO Erodes Human Rights Protections — Three Case 
Studies (1999), http://www.globalexchange.org/campaigns/wto/CaseStudies.html (last visited Feb. 
22, 2011). 
2 These are all matters of vital interest to lawyers that the WTO Agreement itself is largely silent 
about and which have had to be defined, and refined, by panels under the guidance of the Appellate 
Body. See reference to this trinity of issues in Panel Report, U.S. – Continued Existence and 
Application of Zeroing Methodology, WT/DS350/R (Oct. 1, 2008).  
3 Negotiating Group on Dispute Settlement, Note by the Secretariat: Concept, Forms and Effects of 
Arbitration, MTN.GNG/NG13/W/20 (Feb. 22, 1988); the term “dispute” is defined as a specific 
disagreement concerning a matter of fact, law or policy in which a claim or assertion by one party 
is met with refusal, counterclaim or denial by another. Award of the Arbitrators, United States – 
Section 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act, n. 27, WT/DS160/ARB25/1, (Nov. 9, 2001). 
4 Decision by the Arbitrators, U.S. – Anti-Dumping Act of 1916, ¶ 9.1, WT/DS136/ARB (Feb. 24, 
 by an irenical counterpart.  
Traditionally, however, little attention is paid to the duty to settle. This 
is because of the overwhelming emphasis in WTO law on litigation and 
because resolution of these complex disputes usually takes place “off-
stage”, that is, out of the public eye, many years after the dispute actually 
commences. We tend to forget, or be uninterested in, the peaceful and 
cooperative aspects of inter-state behaviour. They are routine and 
humdrum, lacking in colourful histrionics that make litigation so 
compelling. What grabs our attention is the ongoing parade of disputes and 
the political theatre associated with them. Disputes like Bananas, 
Hormones, 1916 Act, Pharmaceuticals, Cotton, and Sugar have each 
garnered interest with their hyperbolic claims and had their “day in the 
sun”. Less often do we pause to consider the fact that the real outcome of 
these cases is settlement. 
Recently, this settlement function has received some attention in the 
course of settling two longstanding WTO disputes, EC – Bananas and EC 
– Hormones. What I want to suggest in this article is that unlike domestic 
private litigation, there is an actual obligation on parties in WTO law to 
resolve the cases they bring. This is not a “hard” obligation in the sense of 
having to achieve a specific result, but rather one of a softer, process-
oriented variety. Countries are required to engage with each other, to put 
adequate resources towards the effort to settle, and to conduct themselves 
in the negotiations in good faith. By comparison, domestic litigation may 
favour settlement, but rarely does it oblige settlement. Instead, as will be 
discussed, domestic litigation imposes obligations on lawyers, rules 
concerning offers, costs consequences and other devices, to move parties 
towards a resolution. WTO law goes a step or two further. It recognizes the 
greater value in having parties actually resolve their differences. 
Why? The obligation to settle disputes is attributable to an overarching 
communitarian ethos that permeates the WTO Agreement. The treaty 
creates a “community” of like-minded member countries which appreciate 
— if not always expressly — that the community provides certain key 
benefits that would be missing in the absence of agreement. The chief 
benefit of the trade regime is certainty: it affords governments and 
individuals the certainty of knowing that they will be treated in a certain 
way.5 That certainty is likely to be disrupted, however, by disputes. The 
                                                                                                           
2004). 
5 See, for instance, Panel Report, China – Measures Affecting Imports of Automobile Parts, ¶ 7.460, 
WT/DS339 (July 18, 2008) (“[T]he main purpose and objective of the WTO Agreement and the 
GATT 1994 is to maintain the security and predictability of reciprocal market access arrangements 
manifested in tariff concessions. This, in our view, means that tariff concessions must be 
interpreted to benefit both the importing Member, China, and exporting Members.”) (emphasis 
added). There are other references in WTO case law to the importance of “security and 
predictability”; for instance, see Panel Report, Argentina – Measures Affecting Imports of 
 treaty therefore stresses the need for members to reconcile and resolve their 
differences, preferably in a way that is acceptable to the parties and the 
WTO membership at large. Thus, countries do not fight simply to fight to 
vindicate their own interest — as the polemical record might infer. They 
fight and settle their disputes in a bid to further the common interest 
protected under the treaty. 
This obligation to settle may appear exceptional, but I will also argue 
that it is simply a manifestation of a greater obligation to cooperate 
identifiable in the law of many international organizations. The obligation 
is sometimes explicitly mentioned in IO constitutive instruments, such as 
Article 2.2 of the U.N. Charter which requires that “all members, in order 
to ensure to all of them the rights and benefits resulting from membership, 
shall fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance 
with the present Charter.”6 Likewise, in the law of the European Union 
(EU) there exist a number of clauses laying down duties of cooperation, 
often referred to as duties of “community solidarity”, on member states 
(Gemeinschaftstreue) and on EU organs (organtreue) that go beyond the 
normal obligation to fulfil treaties in good faith.7 EU states and organs must 
constantly remain aware of the need to act in a general way that reinforces 
the underlying notion of community.8 Something similar occurs in WTO 
law. 
The neglect of this vitally important subject — the duty to settle — is 
also due, at least in part, to the sense of disappointment and “failure” that 
pervades the WTO today. In the public mind, if not the academic mind, 
there is an overwhelming emphasis on the conclusion of “grand” 
multilateral rounds of negotiations like the one concluded at Marrakesh in 
April 1994. At that time the Uruguay Round led to the creation of the WTO 
Agreement. The current round, the Doha Development Round, has been 
ongoing since November 2001 and for many reasons, including ad hoc 
deal-making, the proliferation of regional trade agreements, and continuing 
                                                                                                           
Footwear, Textiles, Apparel and Other Items, ¶ 6.68, WT/DS56/R (Nov. 25, 1997); Panel Report, 
Canada – Measures Affecting the Importation of Milk and the Exportation of Dairy Products, ¶ 
7.154, WT/DS103, 113/R (May 17, 1999); Appellate Body Report, EC – Regime for the 
Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, Second Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by 
Ecuador / Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the United States, ¶ 483, 
WT/DS27AB/RW2/ECU and USA (Nov. 26, 2008) [hereinafter EC – Bananas Appellate Body 
Report]. 
6  See discussion of the duty to cooperate in HENRY SCHERMERS & NIELS BLOKKER, 
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL LAW 108 (1995). 
7 See John Temple Lang, Community Constitutional Law: Article 5 EEC Treaty, 27 COMM. MKT L. 
REV. 645 (1990). 
8 As Jan Klabbers puts it, “Much in the same way as marriage is somehow more than a mere 
contractual arrangement, so too the creation of an organization is an act which involves not just the 
normal good-faith duty to give effect to one’s commitments, but also a spirit of loyalty, 
camaraderie and mutual respect.” JAN KLABBERS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL 
INSTITUTIONAL LAW 176 (2d ed., 2009). 
 differences over agriculture subsidies, there is little sign of its imminent 
conclusion. Consequently, the entire treaty system seems to be clouded by 
the fog of failure. This has, I will argue, bred an underlying sense of 
dissatisfaction with the WTO system, as if it had accomplished nothing. 
Too rarely is there real recognition of the tremendous amount that has 
been achieved. We do not pause to consider the many “small” settlements 
and agreements that have resulted from individual disputes. 
Notwithstanding the failure of Doha to date, there are hundreds of them.9 
Many specialists of WTO law will be familiar with the 2001 Doha 
Declaration on Public Health and the 2003 Decision on Paragraph 6.10 
Fewer, perhaps, will be aware of the way in which the WTO and its dispute 
settlement system have been used for creative purposes to settle differences 
over fishing management and wildlife protection, pesticide residues and 
aircraft financing. WTO disputes have also had follow-on effects 
elsewhere, for instance in UNESCO and the OECD.11 These follow directly 
from the obligation to settle under WTO law and need to be remembered. 
This experience must be considered in evaluating the success of the WTO 
as a treaty and as an international organization. 
II. THE NATURE OF WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 
The obligation to settle in WTO law emanates from the special nature 
of both WTO law and WTO dispute settlement. Whatever else may be said 
about its many purposes, the chief purpose of WTO law is the “stability 
and predictability” of concessions and commitments made under the WTO 
Agreement.12 This is often assimilated within the concept of the “protection 
                                                 
9 For instance, see the Mutually Agreed Solution [hereinafter MAS], Korea – Measures concerning 
the shelf-life of products, G/AG/W/8/Add.1 (Nov. 24, 1995); Minutes of the DSB meeting, United 
States – Imposition of imports duties on automobiles from Japan under Section 301 and 304 of the 
Trade Act of 1974, WT/DSB/M/6 (Aug. 28, 1995); MAS, Korea – Measures Concerning Bottled 
Water, G/AG/W/14/Add.1 (May 6, 1996); Panel Report, EC – Trade Description of Scallops, 
WT/DS7/12 (July 19, 1996); Panel Report, Japan – Import Quotas on Dried Laver and Seasoned 
Laver, WT/DS323/5 (Jan. 27, 2006). These settlements have themselves occasionally been the 
subject of WTO dispute settlement; see EC – Bananas Appellate Body Report, supra note 5, ¶¶ 
433-35. In that case, the arbitrator found that a temporary waiver regulating the EC’s banana quota 
could not be interpreted to modify the EC’s existing tariff commitment on bananas.  
10  See World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 20 November 2001, 
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2; World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 2 September 2003, 
WT/L/540. 
11 For instance, see Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural 
Expressions, Oct. 3-21, 2005, 45 I.L.M. 269, which was prompted, at least in part, by the outcome 
in Panel Report, Canada – Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals, WT/DS31/R (Mar. 14, 
1997), and the Aircraft Sector Understanding on Export Credits for Civil Aircraft, OECD Doc. 
TAD/PG(2007)4/FINAL (2007) which was prompted, at least in part, by the Brazil/Canada – 
Aircraft dispute. 
12 See SCHERMERS & BLOKKER, supra note 6. A further illustration was provided by the panel in 
Panel Report, Colombia – Indicative Prices and Restrictions on Ports of Entry, ¶ 7.274, 
 of expectations”. 13  Accordingly, WTO law is understood to protect 
expectations about the trade-related behaviour of governments, something 
which has been interpreted as constituting a “public good” belonging to the 
entire membership.14 
The “public good” character of concessions and commitments had 
consequences for dispute settlement. The historical record indicates that the 
system which arose evolved naturally from the need identified under GATT 
to resolve differences between countries. Originally, this took the form of 
working parties set up to examine disputes between contracting parties. 
Later, it developed more of a litigation-based approach that, as Robert 
Hudec related, “satisf[ied] the legal instincts of the GATT 
administrators”.15 
The WTO dispute settlement system that came into being in 1995 was 
part of a larger administrative structure, the Dispute Settlement Body 
(DSB), whose function is to administer the WTO Dispute Settlement 
Understanding (DSU). The DSB is described as having: “[T]he authority to 
establish panels, adopt panel and Appellate Body reports, maintain 
surveillance of implementation of ruling and recommendations, and 
authorize suspension of concessions and other obligations . . . . ”16 
These references clarify that it is the DSB — not WTO panels or the 
Appellate Body — that has the ultimate authority and responsibility to 
discharge dispute settlement functions. The DSB fulfills these by meeting 
regularly and by referring specific differences raised by countries in those 
meetings to panels. These differences — referred to in WTO parlance as 
                                                                                                           
WT/DS366/R (Apr. 27, 2009) [hereinafter Colombia – Ports of Entry Panel Report] where, in 
discussing the variable nature of the Colombian law at issue it noted: “When also considering the 
fact that the restrictions on port access have been imposed, extended and removed, then 
subsequently reinstated, importers’ expectations and planning have undoubtedly been affected, 
which has led importers to rearrange shipping schedules, in turn affecting scheduled importation of 
subject goods arriving from Panama. In the Panel's view, all of these uncertainties, including access 
to one seaport for extended periods of time and the likely increased costs that would arise for 
importers operating under the constraints of the port restrictions, limit competitive opportunities for 
imports arriving from Panama.” 
13 See Appellate Body Report, EC – Customs Classification of Certain Computer Equipment, ¶ 109, 
WT/DS62/AB/R (June 5, 1998); for application in the context of GATS, see Appellate Body 
Report, U.S. – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, ¶¶ 
159-160, WT/DS285/AB/R (Apr. 7, 2005). 
14  A public good is a good that is non-rivalrous and non-excludable. Non-rivalry means that 
consumption of the good by one individual does not reduce availability of the good for 
consumption by others; and non-excludability that no one can be effectively excluded from using 
the good. For further reference, see RAYMOND G. BATINA & TOSHIHIRO IHORI, PUBLIC GOODS: 
THEORIES AND EVIDENCE (2005). 
15 ROBERT E. HUDEC, THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM AND WORLD TRADE DIPLOMACY 79 (2d ed., 
1990). 
16  Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, art. 2.1, Annex 2, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 
81 [hereinafter DSU]. 
 “matters” — are the seed from which WTO disputes subsequently take 
life.17 
The important point to be gleaned from this arrangement is that the 
task of panels and the Appellate Body is supplementary and assistive. DSU 
Article 11 makes clear that the function of panels: “is to assist the DSB in 
discharging its responsibilities . . . . ”18 This is described in greater detail as 
follows: “[A] panel should make an objective assessment of the facts of the 
matter before it . . . and make such other findings as will assist the DSB in 
making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in the 
covered agreements.” 
Not surprisingly, the traditional form of conclusion pronounced by a 
panel is styled a “recommendation”, which is habitually adopted by the 
DSB and constitutes the final pronouncement that countries must comply 
with. 
The auxiliary, problem-solving character of panels has noteworthy 
consequences. Panels and the Appellate Body are not required to address 
every claim before them.19 In some instances, it appears that panels and the 
Appellate Body have judiciously avoided making findings that might 
aggravate a dispute.20 And there is no way in WTO dispute settlement to 
address counterclaims. 21  Thus, a number of the features of traditional 
litigation that presume the adjustment of rights among the parties alone are 
                                                 
17 The standard terms of reference for WTO dispute settlement panels is spelled out in DSU Article 
7.1 as being “To examine, in light of the relevant provisions . . . the matter referred to the DSB . . . . 
” (italics added). 
18 For instance, see references in Panel Report, Argentina – Definitive Safeguard Measure on 
Imports of Preserved Peaches, ¶ 7.140, WT/DS238/R (Feb. 14, 2003). 
19 This is made clear in references to “judicial economy”; id. ¶7.140. “Article 11 of the DSU 
provides that the Panel's function is to assist the DSB in discharging its responsibilities under the 
DSU and the covered agreements. It does not require us to examine all the legal claims made by 
Chile. Our findings should assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings 
provided for in the covered agreements. We are mindful of the approach of the Appellate Body in 
U.S. – Wool Shirts and Blouses that we need only address those claims which we consider 
necessary for the resolution of the matter between the parties. At the same time, we are mindful of 
the balancing consideration expressed by the same body in Australia — Salmon that a panel has to 
address those claims on which a finding is necessary in order to enable the DSB to make 
sufficiently precise recommendations and rulings so as to allow for prompt compliance by a 
Member with those recommendations and rulings in order to ensure effective resolution of disputes 
to the benefit of all Members.” 
20 A degree of circumspection can be observed, for instance, in Panel Report, Chile – Price Band 
System and Safeguard Measures Relating to Certain Agricultural Products (21.5), ¶ 7.169, 
WT/DS207/RW (Dec. 8, 2006) where a compliance panel found that Chile had failed to bring 
certain laws into compliance with the WTO Agreement and noted that “It would flow 
automatically that the measure is also in breach of Article XVI:4 of the WTO Agreement. 
Notwithstanding the above, we do not feel that such additional finding is necessary in order to 
resolve the dispute between the parties.” Likewise, in Colombia – Ports of Entry Panel Report, 
supra note 12, ¶¶ 7.290-92, where the panel decided not to examine claims under GATT Art. 
XIII:1 as this would not assist in resolving the dispute.  
21 DSU Article 3.10 provides, “[i]t is understood that complaints and counter-complaints in regard 
to distinct matters should not be linked.” 
 missing. The focus of the system is squarely on resolving disputes to the 
benefit of members as a whole. 
Several other provisions emphasize the dispute settlement system’s 
collective and constructive nature. Perhaps the most important of these is 
DSU Article 3.3, which states that: 
The prompt settlement of situations in which a Member 
considers that any benefits accruing to it directly or indirectly 
under the covered agreements are being impaired by measures 
taken by another Member is essential to the effective 
functioning of the WTO and the maintenance of a proper 
balance between rights and obligations of Members. 
DSU Article 3.4 also provides that “Recommendations or rulings made 
by the DSB shall be aimed at achieving a satisfactory settlement of the 
matter . . . .” 
Nevertheless, parties are not entitled to cooperate in settling matters in 
any way that they please. Outcomes must meet some minimum threshold of 
acceptability. This is evident in DSU Article 3.5: “All solutions to matters 
formally raised under the consultation and dispute settlement provisions of 
the covered agreements, including arbitration awards, shall be consistent 
with those agreements . . . .” 
The WTO dispute settlement system is thus keyed to adjusting rights 
and obligations that belong, in some sense, to the entire WTO membership. 
The resolution of a dispute is really about much more than the parties’ 
direct interests. It is about resolving differences that, if not settled, usually 
have an impact on the entire membership’s common interest.22  This is 
perhaps most evident in DSU Article 3.6, which states: “Mutually agreed 
solutions to matters formally raised under the consultation and dispute 
settlement provisions of the covered agreements shall be notified to the 
DSB and the relevant Councils and Committees, where any member may 
raise any point relating thereto.” 
The duty to settle is therefore to be understood as a duty emanating 
from the nature of the law and the nature of the dispute settlement system 
                                                 
22 For discussion of the way in which concessions made are considered the property of the WTO 
membership as a whole, see Panel Report, EC – Customs Classification of Certain Computer 
Equipment, ¶¶ 45-62, WT/DS62/R (Feb. 5, 1999). For further commentary, see Laurent 
Ruessmann, The place of legitimate expectations in the general interpretation of the WTO 
Agreements (K.U. Leuven Institute for International Law, Working Paper No. 36, Dec. 2002). The 
emphasis on the common expectations of the membership can be traced to the very basis of 
normativity in WTO law. In U.S. – Oil Country Tubular Goods, for instance, the Appellate Body 
expressed the view that a particular document “[h]as normative value because it provided 
administrative guidance and creates expectations among the public and among private actors.” See 
Appellate Body Report, U.S. – Oil Country Tubular Goods, ¶ 187, WT/DS268/AB/R (Nov. 29, 
2004). 
 that is oriented, first and foremost, at “settling” disputes. At the same time, 
settlement sits in delicate balance with the acknowledged need in the 
system to litigate between parties, normally configured as a dyadic pair. 
The two activities — “dispute” and “settlement” — are in tension and must 
be constantly balanced. The balance is, however, always oriented towards 
settlement. 
This orientation is confirmed in the opening words of DSU Article 3.7, 
which state: “Before bringing a case, a Member shall exercise its judgment 
as to whether the action under these procedures would be fruitful. The aim 
of the dispute settlement mechanism is to secure a positive solution to a 
dispute.”  
It has also been affirmed by panels and the Appellate Body. In EC – 
Sugar, for instance, the panel observed that: “the procedural rules of WTO 
dispute settlement are designed to promote, not the development of 
litigation techniques, but the fair, prompt and effective resolution of trade 
disputes.23” 
And in Australia – Salmon the Appellate Body made clear that the aim 
of dispute settlement is “to resolve the matter at issue” and “to secure a 
positive solution to a dispute”.24 
This duty to settle is at odds with the general orientation of the law in 
private law litigation. In Canadian law, for instance, if cooperative duties 
are found, they are generally duties that parties owe to the court, not each 
other in some abstract, communitarian sense. To be sure, there are various 
duties for parties to cooperate in the process of litigation in terms of full 
disclosure and civility.25 More generally, perhaps, there is an obligation not 
to engage in litigation that is frivolous or vexatious.26 Costs consequences 
can be built in to the acceptance or rejection of certain offers. 27 
                                                 
23 Panel Report, EC – Export Subsidies on Sugar (Complaint by Australia), ¶ 7.6, WT/DS265/R 
(Oct. 15, 2004) (emphasis added). 
24  See Appellate Body Report, Australia – Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon, 
WT/DS18/AB/R 223 (Oct. 20, 1998). The principle of judicial economy has to be applied keeping 
in mind the aim of the dispute settlement system. This aim is to resolve the matter at issue and “to 
secure a positive solution to a dispute”. To provide only a partial resolution of the matter at issue 
would be false judicial economy. A panel has to address those claims on which a finding is 
necessary in order to enable the DSB to make sufficiently precise recommendations and rulings so 
as to allow for prompt compliance by a Member with those recommendations and rulings “in order 
to ensure effective resolution of disputes to the benefit of all Members.” 
25 In the Canadian province of Ontario, for instance, lawyer conduct is governed by the Rules of 
Professional Conduct of the Law Society of Upper Canada. 
26 The English doctrine of champerty, for instance, traditionally prevented strangers to lawsuits and 
litigants from concluding agreements to maintain, support or promote another person’s lawsuit. See 
ROBERT H. ARONSON & DONALD T. WECKSTEIN, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY IN A NUTSHELL 
271 (2d ed., 1991). This has now been modified in some jurisdictions. “An action may be 
vexatious if it is obvious that it cannot succeed . . . or if no reasonable person can possibly expect 
to obtain relief from it . . . . ” Foy v. Foy (No. 2), 26 O.R. (2d) 220 (C.A.) 227 (1979). 
27 In the law of many jurisdictions, the law is structured so as to encourage, but not require, parties 
 Additionally, there are duties on parties not to aggravate the underlying 
situation that gives rise to the dispute, such as the doctrine of mitigation in 
contract.28 Nevertheless, none of these specific duties amounts to a duty to 
settle. Parties are allowed to insist on the scrupulous observance of their 
rights. 
Why? The explanation for the distinction between WTO and ordinary 
domestic litigation lies in the nature of the “community” that the law 
creates and contemplates. Domestic private law, in particular, is predicated 
upon a view of individuals as autonomous bearers of rights and obligations 
that are interchangeable. If one party breaches an agreement or commits a 
civil wrong, the solution is damages aimed at making the plaintiff whole.29 
In general, no ongoing injury to the remainder of the community is 
assumed. In Anglo-American contract law, this doctrine has been taken to 
its logical limit in the body of law that privileges damages over specific 
performance.30 
WTO law is different. It constantly assumes the parties are repeat 
players and that they have come together to protect a public “good” which 
the law creates via the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) obligation. The 
wider, communitarian vision that underlies WTO law is based ultimately 
on the fact of economic interdependence.31 It, too, is probably also the 
reason why countries themselves have been relatively uninterested in 
reform proposals put forward in the last decade by commentators like Kyle 
Bagwell, Petros Mavroidis and Robert Staiger who have suggested, for 
instance, that “stronger” remedies, or tradeable rights to retaliate, might be 
                                                                                                           
to settle their differences by means of offers to settle. In many jurisdictions as well, the failure to 
accept a reasonable offer can have serious consequences for the instransigent party. For instance, 
see Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194,  Rule 49.10(1) (offers by plaintiffs) 
and 49.10(2) (offers by defendant).  
28 Mitigation is generally understood to be the doctrine in Anglo-American contract law that bars 
the plaintiff from recovering any damages for his or her loss which the claimant could have 
avoided. HUGH BEALE, CHITTY ON CONTRACTS: VOL. 1, at 1666 (30th ed., 2008). 
29 In tort, for instance, “The general object of an award of damages is to compensate the claimant 
for the losses, pecuniary and non-pecuniary, sustained as a result of the defendant’s tort.” CLERK & 
LINDSELL ON TORTS 1883 (Anthony M. Dugdale & Michael A. Jones eds., 20th ed., 2010). 
30 “[T]he traditional view was that specific performance would not be ordered where damages were 
an “adequate” remedy.” BEALE, supra note 28, at 1719.  
31 Thus, for instance, in Panel Report, EC – Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of 
Bananas, ¶ 7.50, WT/DS27/R/USA (May 22, 1997) the Panel noted concerning rules of standing in 
WTO dispute settlement that “with the increased interdependence of the global economy, which 
means that actions taken in one country are likely to have significant effects on trade and foreign 
direct investment flows in others, Members have a greater stake in enforcing WTO rules than in the 
past since any deviation from the negotiated balance of rights and obligations is more likely than 
ever to affect them, directly or indirectly. Since the United States is likely to be affected by the EC 
regime, it would have an interest in a determination of whether the EC regime is inconsistent with 
the requirements of WTO rules. Thus, in our view a Member's potential interest in trade in goods 
or services and its interest in a determination of rights and obligations under the WTO Agreement 
are each sufficient to establish a right to pursue a WTO dispute settlement proceeding.” 
 useful in the dispute settlement system.32 On the whole countries appear to 
be ready to accept the WTO dispute settlement system as it is. The aim is 
not stronger retaliation. Rather, it is to use “the substance of a conflict as a 
means of exploring options and establishing responses that are not only 
acceptable to all parties but develop and strengthen relationships among 
those involved.”33 
III. SOME POINTS OF COMPARISON 
I have argued above that the character of WTO law and dispute 
settlement is exceptional, but not wholly so. There are other legal systems 
that emphasize the collective ethos and settlement. To some extent, 
settlement might even be deemed a characteristic of all legal systems 
inasmuch as law normally contemplates a state of peace among parties 
while disputes are the exception. 
In international law, for instance, Henry Schermers and Niels Blokker 
have observed that members of an international organization are under a 
duty to behave as good members, “a duty which can be seen as part of a 
modern general principle of law: the duty to cooperate.”34 Jan Klabbers has 
also pointed out that this duty is expressed in the constituent treaties of a 
number of IOs and goes beyond the usual duty to fulfill treaty obligations 
in good faith.35 The problem with such a duty, however, is that it is rarely 
specific. There is a need for criteria that might concretize it when expressed 
as the duty to settle. 
Two potential sources from domestic law are the fields of labour 
relations and indigenous treaty talks. In both, a “relational” element 
prevails that modifies the negotiating environment.36 The parties’ proximity 
and the fact that they will have to continue working together point to a 
“public good” framework not unlike the one in WTO law. Parties are under 
an obligation to negotiate and settle their disputes in order to safeguard the 
peace — or greater good — inherent in their relationship. 
In Canadian labour relations law, for instance, a rich jurisprudence has 
developed concerning the “duty to bargain”, which is defined by statute in 
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 the Canada Labour Code as follows: 
50. Where notice to bargain collectively has been given under 
this Part, 
(a) the bargaining agent and the employer, without delay, but in 
any case within 20 days after the notice was given unless the 
parties otherwise agree, shall 
(i) meet and commence, or cause authorized representatives on 
their behalf to meet and commence, to bargain collectively in 
good faith, and 
(ii) make every reasonable effort to enter into a collective 
agreement. 
What is noteworthy about experience under the domestic law of labour 
relations is that its principal preoccupations are, as we shall see, strikingly 
similar to those found in the duty to settle in WTO law.37 First, there is the 
issue of what triggers the duty. This has been held to be notice to bargain 
given by either party. Throughout Canada all labour relations statutes 
specify the precise timing of such notices.38 
A second observation about the labour relations analogy is that the 
duty to bargain has been elaborated to prohibit certain specific conduct, 
such as misrepresentations, and at times has been interpreted to censure a 
party’s entire bargaining stance where a decision-maker concludes that the 
real object of the party’s behaviour is to avoid coming to a collective 
agreement. Nevertheless, an important point to note here — especially in 
the WTO context — is that an underlying philosophy of the duty to bargain 
as developed in Canadian labour law is that the duty embraces a “freedom 
of contract” rationale. That is, that the parties are best able to determine the 
content of their agreements themselves and, failing agreement, each party 
has recourse to economic sanctions.39 In particular, Canadian cases reveal a 
reluctance among labour tribunals to review the “fairness” of proposals or, 
by way of remedy, to impose agreement. Tribunals therefore try to 
understand and honour the dynamic of power bargaining. They do not 
regard their role as being to redress imbalances of economic power 
between the parties. 40 Thus, save in exceptional circumstances, the 
requirement of “reasonable efforts” set out in the Canada Labour Code has 
generally not been applied to justify a searching review of the 
reasonableness of proposals that each side makes but instead has been used 
to mandate “rational discussion” and other reasonable procedural rules 
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 which are more likely to lead to a collective agreement. 
A third observation is that while the specific statutory formula in 
Canadian law varies slightly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, both the duty 
of good faith and the duty of reasonable efforts that comprise the duty to 
bargain have not been interpreted as a duty to agree or a duty to a 
particular bargain.41 Longstanding authority holds that there is no reason 
why the subject matter of bargaining should not include anything that is 
consistent with the law.42  As for tactics in the bargaining process, the 
highest duty appears to be to preserve the right of each party to safeguard 
its freedom respecting its bargaining position and to state its position on the 
matters in issue.43 At the same time, decision-makers have taken the view 
that such a duty is only amenable to the most minimal legal enforcement, 
this being understood as enforcement of the obligation to meet and 
exchange positions.44 Tribunals have made it clear that while they do not 
condone minimal adherence to standards of good faith bargaining, there is 
an overarching concern with writing into the law standards that are 
effectively unenforceable or that encourage either minimum bargaining or 
litigation.45 Again, as we will see, this concern has clear parallels in WTO 
dispute settlement. 
A fourth and final observation to be drawn from the experience of 
labour relations is that Canadian tribunals have held that there are some 
subjects on which bargaining is prohibited. This includes anything that is 
expressly contrary to law or what is traditionally considered to be under 
unilateral employer control. Thus, for instance, decisions on subcontracting 
and plant-closing decisions have been characterized as core management 
decisions and complaints based on them liable to dismissal.46   
Still, it is doubtful whether such highly evolved requirements of 
settlement can be effortlessly transposed into international law. Thus, 
another source of analogy for the duty to cooperate and settle, and one that, 
given its nature, is perhaps inherently somewhat closer to the model of 
WTO dispute settlement, is that of Canada’s recent experience of 
negotiations with indigenous peoples. Canada’s territory is home to more 
than 600 native tribes, or “bands”, that represent the indigenous peoples 
who lived in Canada before the arrival of Europeans.47 In many cases these 
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 peoples negotiated “treaties” with the English or French Crown several 
hundred years ago that allowed the government to obtain title to most of 
their lands. Each treaty delineated a tract of land which was thought to be 
the traditional territory of the First Nation or Nations signing the treaty.48 In 
exchange for a surrender of their rights and title to these lands, the First 
Nations were promised a smaller parcel of land as a reserve, annual annuity 
payments, implements to either farm or hunt and fish, and the right to 
continue to hunt and trap, and in some cases fish, on the tract surrendered.  
Today these peoples, like the indigenous peoples of Taiwan and 
elsewhere, have sought redress for outstanding claims related to these 
arrangements in the form of either comprehensive or specific claims. 49 
Comprehensive claims deal with the unfinished business of treaty-making 
in Canada. These claims arise in areas where Aboriginal land rights have 
not been dealt with by past treaties or through other legal means. In these 
areas, forward-looking modern treaties are negotiated between the First 
Nation(s) in question, Canada and the province or territory. Specific claims 
deal with past grievances of First Nations. 
In 1973 Canada first established policies on Aboriginal claims, along 
with processes and funding for resolving these claims through negotiation. 
These are optional processes that provide Aboriginal groups with an 
alternative to going to court to resolve their claims. The federal government 
takes the position that the claims process is in the best interest of all 
Canadians, Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal alike.50 As a result, a number of 
negotiations on both comprehensive and specific claims are ongoing and 
the amount of land claims concluded to date is substantial.51 The process 
has also resulted in a number of new legal concepts, such as recognition of 
Aboriginal title and ongoing duties to negotiate among native peoples and 
the government.52 
The key here is, however, that these arrangements place an emphasis 
on negotiation. Parties know that they will be repeat players and will have 
to deal with each other on a continuing basis into the future. A modest body 
of case law has developed to define, and give content to, the duty to 
negotiate. At present, the duty appears to be less well-developed than in the 
labour relations context, probably because of the wide-ranging and delicate 
issues that the negotiations often touch upon and also because the courts 
have shown an awareness of the legacy of aboriginal-government relations, 
a legacy marked by both dependency and mistrust. 
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 In Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests) 53 , for 
example, the Supreme Court of Canada recalled that there was 
longstanding recognition in Canadian law of a duty on the government to 
consult with indigenous people as part of the government’s traditional 
fiduciary duty owed to indigenous people.54 More recently, the Supreme 
Court has held that the duty to consult and accommodate is founded upon 
the honour of the government, which requires public officials, acting 
honourably, to participate in processes of negotiation with the view to 
effecting reconciliation between the government and Aboriginal people. 
In Haida, the Chief Justice of Canada observed that the duty to consult 
arises: “[W]hen the Crown [i.e. the government] has knowledge, real or 
constructive, of the potential existence of the Aboriginal right or title and 
contemplates conduct that might adversely affect it.”55 
However, while knowledge of a credible but unproven claim suffices 
to trigger a duty to consult and, if appropriate, accommodate, the content of 
the duty varies with the circumstances.56 Precisely what is required of the 
government may vary with the strength of the claim and the impact of the 
contemplated government conduct on the rights at issue. Thus, in a 
situation of minimal impact or where the claim to title is weak, “the only 
duty on the Crown may be to give notice, disclose information, and discuss 
any issues raised”.57 In Haida the Court said that “‘[C]onsultation’ in its 
least technical definition is talking together for mutual understanding.”58 At 
the opposite end of the spectrum is the situation where the impact is likely 
high. Here, “[w]hile precise requirements will vary with the 
circumstances”, the Court said that “the consultation required at this stage 
may entail the opportunity to make submissions for consideration, formal 
participation in the decision-making process, and provision of written 
reasons to show that Aboriginal concerns were considered and to reveal the 
impact they had on the [final] decision.”59 
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 In another case, Gitanyow First Nation v. Canada,60 the hereditary 
chiefs of the Gitanyow First Nation, on Canada’s West Coast, brought an 
action against the government seeking two declarations with respect to 
indigenous treaty negotiations, one of which provided that the federal 
government, having undertaken and proceeded to negotiate a treaty with 
the Gitanyow, was obliged to negotiate in good faith within the treaty 
process and make every effort to conclude a treaty that secures the 
Gitanyow rights. The Court granted the first declaration in part, but 
observed that since negotiations had yet to commence, “[t]he detailed 
content of the [government’s] duty to negotiate in good faith is not 
determined at this stage.” It also concluded, however, that in general the 
duty to negotiate must include at least the absence of any appearance of 
“sharp dealing,” the disclosure of relevant factors, and negotiation “without 
oblique motive.”61 
 
IV. THE DUTY TO SETTLE IN WTO LAW: U.S. – SHRIMP AND 
U.S. – CONTINUED SUSPENSION 
 
With these examples in mind, we are in a better position to assess what 
is actually happening in WTO law and the pronouncements made in 
relation to the duty to settle. I propose to look at outcomes in two WTO 
cases, U.S. – Shrimp and U.S. – Continued Suspension. These help to 
illustrate what issues and considerations have been raised in the actual 
practice of WTO dispute settlement. 
In U.S. – Shrimp the matter at issue was a challenge by four countries 
of Section 609 of U.S. Public Law 101-162 Relating to the Protection of 
Sea Turtles in Shrimp Trawl Fishing Operations (the “Revised 
Guidelines”). The U.S. law originally required certification, on a country-
by-country basis, that shrimping operations were “turtle-friendly”. The U.S. 
standard, negotiated with countries in the Western Hemisphere as part of 
the Inter-American Convention for the Protection and Conservation of Sea 
Turtles, was extended to the entire world by a decision of the U.S. Court of 
International Trade in 1996. 62  The standard did not take account of 
domestic efforts to protect turtles. Rather, it effectively required that all 
countries apply the U.S. standard mandating the use of Turtle Excluder 
Devices (TEDs). After a WTO finding that the extension amounted to 
“unjustifiable discrimination” and “arbitrary discrimination” under the 
preamble of GATT Article XX, the United States took a cue from the 
Appellate Body’s criticism of its failure to consult with its trading partners 
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 to conclude an Indian Ocean and South East Asian Marine Turtle 
Memorandum of Understanding.63  
In U.S. – Continued Suspension the matter at issue arose from an 
earlier dispute, EC – Hormones, where the U.S. and Canada challenged an 
EC ban on the importation of beef treated with certain growth promoting 
hormones. EC – Hormones involved the imposition of a 100% ad valorem 
duty by the U.S. and Canada on selected EC food products. 64  The 
retaliation remained in place until May 2009 when the U.S. and EU signed 
a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on the dispute.65 The U.S. – EU 
MOU established a phase-in period over several years. In each phase the 
U.S. would be entitled to expanded market access for progressively greater 
amounts of U.S. High Quality (i.e. hormone-free) beef in the EU in 
exchange for a phase-out of the U.S. retaliation. The MOU is scheduled to 
conclude in May 2013. 
In both U.S. – Shrimp and U.S. – Continued Suspension what was most 
notable were not the specific settlements achieved, but the indications made 
by panels and the Appellate Body as to what the duty to settle specifically 
entails. In addition, collective assistance was evident in the form of 
suggestions by other countries as to ways of settling the dispute. 
As a result of U.S. efforts at compliance in U.S. – Shrimp, countries 
could apply for certification under U.S. law even if they did not require the 
use of TEDs. In such cases, a harvesting country had to demonstrate that it 
had implemented, and was enforcing, a “comparably effective” regulatory 
programme.66 However, on the grounds that the U.S. had not implemented 
appropriately the recommendations of the DSB, Malaysia challenged the 
U.S. implementation pursuant to DSU Article 21.5 in October 2000.67 The 
compliance panel found that: 
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 [I]n light of the recommendations and rulings of the DSB, 
Section 609 of Public Law 101-162, as implemented by the 
Revised Guidelines of 8 July 1999 and as applied so far by the 
[United States] authorities, is justified under Article XX of the 
GATT 1994 as long as the conditions stated in the findings of 
this Report, in particular the ongoing serious good faith efforts 
to reach a multilateral agreement, remain satisfied.68 
It went on to urge: 
Malaysia and the United States to cooperate fully in order to 
conclude as soon as possible an agreement which will permit 
the protection and conservation of sea turtles to the satisfaction 
of all interests involved and taking into account the principle 
that States have common but differentiated responsibilities to 
conserve and protect the environment.69 
An appeal of the compliance panel’s decision was launched by 
Malaysia in July 2001. The appeal is interesting for its canvassing of 
several issues relevant to settlement. Among them were when the 
obligation to settle is exhausted, who must agree, and what the relevant 
benchmark should be. 
Several third parties had concerns that mirror those evidenced in the 
shape of domestic law, seen above. Australia objected to the panel report, 
saying that the panel erred in its conclusion that simply entering into 
negotiations was enough to insulate the U.S. from a claim that it had failed 
to engage in good faith negotiations. Something more was required.70 The 
EC emphasized that international cooperation “is a process and not a 
result.”71  Such cooperation is necessarily based on reciprocal efforts to 
resolve a common concern in the mutual interest. To the EC it therefore 
appeared “that international cooperation requires as a minimum the 
exchange of data and readily available scientific knowledge between all 
interested parties.”72 Japan submitted that “it seems logical to assume that 
by engaging in sufficiently ‘serious good faith’ negotiations and meeting 
other requirements, the United States has addressed ‘arbitrary or 
unjustifiable discrimination’.”73 However, Japan went on to observe that 
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 while “the notion of ‘serious’ and ‘good faith’ is subjective in nature, a 
more objective test, such as a common recognition by other negotiating 
countries on the necessity of the measure in question, may be needed . . . 
.”74 Japan considered that the Panel should have explicitly indicated in its 
Report whether support for, or recognition of, the revised measure by other 
countries would play a part in satisfying the settlement requirement.75 
Malaysia had raised two main arguments on appeal:  
1. the nature and the extent of the duty to pursue international cooperation 
in the protection and conservation of sea turtles, and 
2. the flexibility of the Revised Guidelines. Malaysia’s position, as 
appellant, was that “demonstrating serious, good faith efforts to 
negotiate an international agreement for the protection and 
conservation of sea turtles is not sufficient to meet the requirements of 
the chapeau of Article XX.”76 
Malaysia maintained that the chapeau required instead the conclusion 
of such an international agreement. 
With respect to the first issue the Appellate Body took the position that 
to avoid “arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination” as per the chapeau of 
Article XX, the United States had to provide all exporting countries 
“similar opportunities to negotiate” an international agreement. 77  In 
particular, it stated that: 
[G]iven the specific mandate contained in Section 609, and 
given the decided preference for multilateral approaches voiced 
by WTO Members and others in the international community in 
various international agreements for the protection and 
conservation of endangered sea turtles that were cited in our 
previous Report, the United States, in our view, would be 
expected to make good faith efforts to reach international 
agreements that are comparable from one forum of negotiation 
to the other.78 
However, the Appellate Body also stated that “the negotiations need 
not be identical.”79 It added: 
[N]o two negotiations can ever be identical, or lead to identical 
results. Yet the negotiations must be comparable in the sense 
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 that comparable efforts are made, comparable resources are 
invested, and comparable energies are devoted to securing an 
international agreement. So long as such comparable efforts are 
made, it is more likely that “arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination” will be avoided . . . . 80 
At the same time, the Appellate Body took a moderate position on the 
issue of whether or not the obligation to negotiate included a duty to 
conclude a settlement. It stated: 
Requiring that a multilateral agreement be concluded by the 
United States in order to avoid “arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination” in applying its measure would mean that any 
country party to the negotiations with the United States, 
whether a WTO Member or not, would have, in effect, a veto 
over whether the United States could fulfill its WTO 
obligations. Such a requirement would not be reasonable. For a 
variety of reasons, it may be possible to conclude an agreement 
with one group of countries but not another.81 
The Appellate Body also disagreed with the panel that successful 
efforts by the U.S. to conclude an Inter-American Convention could in any 
way be considered a legal “benchmark”, or in other words, an objective 
standard. Instead, the Appellate Body focused on the particulars of the 
negotiations, observing that even though the projected agreement was 
voluntary (as opposed to legally binding) and not concluded at the time of 
the original compliance proceedings, the U.S. had actively undertaken 
negotiations and supported them financially. 82  The Inter-American 
Convention was useful as an “example” 83  but differences in “factual 
circumstances have to be kept in mind.”84 
A second issue was flexibility: to what extent did the alleged 
“unilateral” measure of the U.S. have to be made pliant to other countries’ 
standards? Here, the neat question was whether flexibility in question was 
in relation to both means and results. The Appellate Body stated: 
[T]here is an important difference between conditioning market 
access on the adoption of essentially the same programme, and 
conditioning market access on the adoption of a programme 
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 comparable in effectiveness. Authorizing an importing Member 
to condition market access on exporting Members putting in 
place regulatory programmes comparable in effectiveness to 
that of the importing Member gives sufficient latitude to the 
exporting Member with respect to the programme it may adopt 
to achieve the level of effectiveness required. It allows the 
exporting Member to adopt a regulatory programme that is 
suitable to the specific conditions prevailing in its territory.85 
On this basis, and the fact that the U.S.’s revised legislation allowed 
for consideration of the specific circumstances in any exporting country, 
the Appellate Body concluded that “the Revised Guidelines, on their face, 
permit a degree of flexibility that, in our view, will enable the United States 
to consider the particular conditions prevailing in Malaysia . . . .”86 
A second case of interest to the obligation to settle is U.S. – Continued 
Suspension.87 This was a case that, on its face, was very different from 
U.S. – Shrimp. Here the underlying dispute was considerably more mature. 
Positions had hardened and it might naturally be thought that the 
achievement of a settlement would be more difficult.  
The specific “matter” in U.S. – Continued Suspension was provoked by 
certain actions of the EC to resolve the EC – Hormones dispute. That 
dispute, it will be recalled, had formally ended in April 1999 with WTO 
authorization to the U.S. and Canada to retaliate against the EC because of 
its failure to remove an import ban on hormone-treated beef. The Appellate 
Body held that the original ban failed to comply with SPS Article 5.1, 
which required the EC to conduct a risk assessment. In June 2003 the EC 
withdrew the original ban but immediately replaced it with legislation that 
continued to have the same effect. In the meantime, however, retaliation by 
the U.S. and Canada continued. The EC brought the Continued Suspension 
case on the basis that both the U.S. and Canada had failed to remove their 
retaliation despite the EC’s alleged removal of inconsistent measures, the 
unilateral determinations by both the U.S. and Canada that the replacement 
legislation was a continuing WTO violation, and the alleged failure of the 
U.S. and Canada to follow WTO dispute settlement procedures in 
continuing the ban. 
Of particular concern in U.S. – Continued Suspension was the silence 
of DSU Article 22.8 on the termination of WTO retaliation. Who is entitled 
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 to make a determination that compliance has been achieved? The 
complainant? The defendant? WTO dispute settlement? And what 
obligations rest upon the parties to try and resolve disputes once retaliation 
has begun?  
The procedural sequence of the case was a request by the EC for the 
establishment of a panel in January 2005. A panel report was issued in 
March 2008.88 This was appealed and an Appellate Body report rendered in 
October 2008.89 The Appellate Body began its analysis by observing the 
process-driven nature of WTO dispute settlement. WTO dispute settlement 
is conceived of as “a continuum of events” and cases alternate between 
dispute settlement and the DSB until substantive compliance is achieved.90 
However, the Appellate Body also observed that: 
This does not mean that Members can remain passive once 
concessions have been suspended pursuant to the DSB's 
authorization. The requirement that the suspension of 
concessions must be temporary indicates that the suspension of 
concessions, as the last resort available under the DSU when 
compliance is not achieved, is an abnormal state of affairs that 
is not meant to remain indefinitely.91  
In particular, the Appellate Body observed that: 
Members must act in a cooperative manner so that the normal 
state of affairs, that is, compliance with the covered agreements 
and absence of the suspension of concessions, may be restored 
as quickly as possible. Thus, both the suspending Member and 
the implementing Member share the responsibility to ensure 
that the application of the suspension of concessions is 
“temporary”. . . . Where, as in this dispute, an implementing 
measure is taken and Members disagree as to whether this 
measure achieves substantive compliance, both Members have a 
duty to engage in WTO dispute settlement in order to establish 
whether the conditions in Article 22.8 have been met and 
whether, as a consequence, the suspension of concessions must 
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89 Appellate Body Report, U.S. – Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC – Hormones 
Dispute, WT/DS321/AB/R (Oct. 16, 2008) [hereinafter U.S. – Continued Suspension Appellate 
Body Report].  
90 Id. ¶ 7.64 (citing Mexico – Corn Syrup (Article 21.5 – U.S.)); id. ¶ 121. 
91 Id. ¶ 310. 
 be terminated.92  
As to how this obligation to cooperate is to be activated, the Appellate 
Body stated: 
[DSU] Article 21.5 does not indicate which party may initiate 
proceedings under this provision. Rather, the language of the 
provision is neutral on this matter, and it is open to either party 
to refer the matter to an Article 21.5 panel to resolve this 
disagreement. The text of Article 21.5, therefore, leaves open 
the possibility that either party to the original dispute may 
initiate the proceedings.93 
Thus, an underlying idea of collectivity and the communitarian value 
of prompt resolution prevails over continued suspension, implying that the 
obligation to end retaliation is a shared responsibility. And here a certain 
“mixing” occurs, a mixity that is perhaps best displayed in the Appellate 
Body’s comments as to the burden of proof. The usual rule as to the burden 
of proof in WTO law is stated in U.S. – Shirts and Blouses as follows: “[I]t 
is a generally accepted canon of evidence in civil law, common law and, in 
fact, most jurisdictions, that the burden of proof rests upon the party, 
whether complaining or defending, who asserts the affirmative of a 
particular claim or defence.”94 
In U.S. – Continued Suspension the usual rule appears to be modified: 
Much of the reluctance of the parties to secure a definitive 
determination in respect of Article 22.8 is the apprehension that, 
upon initiation, a party will attract the full burden of proof . . . . 
In our view, the allocation of the burden of proof, in the context 
of Article 22.8, should not be determined simply on the basis of 
a mechanistic rule that the party who initiates the proceedings 
bears the burden of proof. As we have indicated, in case of a 
disagreement, both parties are under an obligation to secure a 
definitive multilateral determination as to whether the 
suspension of concessions must be terminated. The burden of 
proof does not attach to a party simply because such party 
discharges this obligation. To hold otherwise would create a 
                                                 
92 Id. (emphasis added). 
93 Id. ¶ 347 (emphasis added). 
94 Appellate Body Report, U.S. – Measure Affecting Imports of Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses 
from India, at 13, WT/DS33/AB/R (Apr. 25, 1997). 
 disincentive to act in a manner which we consider to be 
obligatory and desirable.95 
These comments appear to reinforce the idea that settlement is a joint 
obligation of all the parties to a WTO dispute, and in some sense, of the 
WTO membership as a whole. This is reflected in the fact that there is 
considerable discussion in U.S. – Continued Suspension of the obligation to 
“have recourse to” and “abide by” WTO dispute settlement procedures in 
accordance with DSU Article 23 — itself a multilateral process.96 Where a 
disagreement arises as to whether a measure found to be in violation has 
been removed, the Appellate Body indicated that “this disagreement must 
be resolved through Article 21.5 proceedings”.97 Obviously, in the normal 
course, the original violator bears the burden of proving that the violation 
has in fact been removed, although the Appellate Body concluded that 
“[t]his does not mean that [the original complainants] do not have an 
obligation to engage in the dispute settlement procedures in a cooperative 
manner.”98 
V. CONCLUSION 
Decisions in both U.S. – Shrimp and U.S. – Continued Suspension 
reveal that the duty to settle in WTO dispute settlement is a plurilateral, and 
to some extent multilateral, one. The duty rests in the first instance on the 
shoulders of the litigants but is also subject to multilateral review by the 
entire WTO membership under DSU Article 3.6. To date, few cases have 
formally raised the issue of review, probably because settlement practices 
are most often subject to “horse-trading” in the DSB.99 This activity also 
tends to blur the permissive/prohibitive distinction to settlement seen in 
domestic labour law.100 Nevertheless, a focus on settlement helps to correct 
                                                 
95 U.S. – Continued Suspension Appellate Body Report, supra note 89 ¶ 359-60 (italics added). 
96 DSU Article 23 requires that WTO members have exclusive recourse to, and abide by, WTO 
dispute settlement results. 
97 U.S. – Continued Suspension Appellate Body Report, supra note 89, ¶ 389. 
98 Id. ¶ 409 (emphasis added). 
99  The structure of the DSU suggests that there is some intention to exercise multilateral 
surveillance of the solutions that are arrived at. This surveillance has in fact happened in several 
high-profile cases such as EC – Bananas where direct challenges have resulted to the settlements 
reached, but the reality is that surveillance takes time and resources are limited. It is probably 
impossible today for any one WTO member country to keep tabs on every settlement being 
concluded in the WTO legal system. We have to presume that only cursory attention is being paid 
and that a substantial amount is probably slipping through the WTO compliance net. 
100 A number of settlements arising out of WTO dispute settlement in fact have been WTO-
inconsistent. A particularly illustrative example is that of the Canada – U.S. Lumber dispute, which 
began in March 2001 at the time of the expiration of the pre-existing Softwood Lumber Agreement 
between Canada and the U.S.. The expiration provoked a flurry of litigation in the WTO and 
elsewhere. The Government of Canada challenged different aspects of the DOC’s determinations 
 the (mis)impression that WTO law and WTO dispute settlement are only 
— or even primarily — about disputes. 
I have argued in this article that the entire ethos of WTO law is heavily 
permeated with the obligation to settle and to observe obligations. This is a 
by-product of the law in question, a law established for the benefit of the 
membership as a whole. In U.S. – Continued Suspension the aversion to 
disputes disruptive of obligations was referred to by the Appellate Body, 
which termed the suspension of concessions “temporary” and “an abnormal 
state of affairs that is not meant to remain indefinitely”. Frequently, 
however, our attention to the “fireworks” of individual cases diverts 
attention away from this important goal. Often, we see WTO litigation 
purely in terms of litigation rather than the long-term aims it is meant to 
promote.  
The emerging law of settlement emphasizes that while the duty to 
settle might be conceived of as largely procedural if appropriate domestic 
law analogies are accessed, in WTO law there has been some elaboration of 
what the duty entails substantively. It consists of a “soft” duty to negotiate, 
but as was pointed out in U.S. – Shrimp, this appears to involve more than 
simply entering into negotiations. Countries will be required to exchange 
data and readily available scientific knowledge, and to listen to each other’s 
positions. Although the case law has not dealt with this specific question 
yet, it is probable that some degree of failure to engage might amount to 
bad faith in WTO law.  
At the same time, the duty to negotiate a settlement cannot be 
converted into a duty to agree. As was noted in U.S. – Shrimp, maintaining 
that a duty to negotiate is the same as a duty to agree gives a potential 
holdout the power to veto a country’s compliance with the WTO 
Agreement. 
What of objective benchmarks? Where do we find reasonable 
standards for what settlement requires? In U.S. – Shrimp the Appellate 
Body emphasized the point that: 
                                                                                                           
under the WTO Agreement and NAFTA Ch. 19, Canadian lumber producers challenged the U.S. 
decision not to refund anti-dumping duties as a violation of NAFTA Ch. 11, and both the 
Government of Canada and the Coalition for Fair Lumber Imports, part of the U.S. lumber lobby, 
engaged in follow-up litigation before U.S. courts. See Chi Carmody, International Decisions, 
100(3) AM. J. INTL L. 664, 664-674 (2006). On 12 October 2006 the U.S. and Canada informed the 
DSB that they had reached a mutually agreed solution to all of their WTO litigation. In light of this 
mutually agreed solution, WTO action was withdrawn. This was despite the fact that the settlement 
reached was WTO-inconsistent in the sense that it imposed restrictions on imports of Canadian 
softwood lumber in violation of free trade commitments. Agreement on Safeguards, art. 11.1(b), 
Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 154, states that “a [WTO] Member shall not seek, take or maintain 
any voluntary export restraints, orderly marketing arrangements or any other similar measures on 
the export or the import side.” See also General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (1994), art. XI, 
Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 187. 
 [N]o two negotiations can ever be identical, or lead to identical 
results. Yet the negotiations must be comparable in the sense 
that comparable efforts are made, comparable resources are 
invested, and comparable energies are devoted to securing an 
international agreement. So long as such comparable efforts are 
made, it is more likely that “arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination” will be avoided between countries where an 
importing Member concludes an agreement with one group of 
countries, but fails to do so with another group of countries.101 
The Appellate Body was, however, reluctant to term what the U.S. had 
entered into with other countries a hard “benchmark”. Rather, it was 
referred to as an “example”. Still, in the circumstances of marine 
conservation it observed that “a multilateral approach is strongly preferred. 
Yet it is one thing to prefer a multilateral approach . . . it is another to 
require the conclusion of a multilateral agreement . . . . ”102 Thus, there 
appears to be an important contextual element to settlement under the WTO 
Agreement, one which encourages the striking of a balance between 
bilateral, plurilateral and multilateral tensions underlying the treaty and 
depending on the subject matter involved. 
The domestic law example of the duty to negotiate is helpful because it 
provides some idea of what WTO law might look like in future. Domestic 
labour law is much more developed than WTO law. It features, for 
instance, strict timelines about the duty to bargain, yet even here, courts are 
reluctant to impose settlements on parties. There is respect for the 
underlying power dynamic, something the organs of WTO dispute 
settlement appear to be acutely conscious of. What is perhaps most 
interesting in cases like U.S. – Shrimp is the way that other countries 
participating as third parties — Australia, the EC, Japan — appeared to 
contribute to a solution sotto voce by identifying issues and offering 
interpretations and solutions. There is, in other words, a communitarian 
aspect to the legal result.  
Thus, what the law of settlement in the WTO emphasizes is a need for 
countries to be actively involved with, or what Martti Koskenniemi has 
referred to “authentically committed” to, international law.103 Many legal 
systems foresee this kind of behaviour as the only one that will allow the 
law to work. There are fine limits to what written laws will achieve if the 
                                                 
101 U.S. – shrimp Appellate Body Report, supra note 70, ¶ 122 (emphasis in original). 
102 Id. ¶ 124. 
103  MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA 546 (2005). Koskenniemi says that 
authentic commitment, or what can be termed an “ethic of responsibility”, involves three features: 
“1. the accountability of each for the choices one makes, 2. the exercise of discretionary power so 
as [to] take account and fairly assess the widest range of consequences of one’s acts, and 3. 
responsiveness to the claims of others.” 
 spirit of the laws is not observed. In the Dao deching it is said that “the 
more laws are promulgated, the greater the number of thieves [Fa Ling Tzu 
Chang Tao Chei To Yu ].”104 
The aphorism can be interpreted in a variety of ways. One way is to 
recognize that beyond a certain stage the formal law is exhausted and what 
becomes important is li (禮), “variously defined, in its totality, as ‘moral 
law’, as ‘customary, uncodified law, internalized by individuals’, as ‘the 
concrete institutions and the accepted modes of behaviour in a civilized 
state’, as the ‘moral and social rules of conduct’, as ‘propriety’ and as the 
‘courtesy, customs and traditions we come to share . . . following the 
human Way’.” 105  Patrick Glenn has observed that “li is not passive 
deference to external patters. It is a making of society that requires the 
investment of oneself and one’s own sense of importance.”106 So too with 
WTO law. The duty to settle stems from the need for countries to truly 
apply themselves to the process of making — and remaking — an 
international community expressed through law, and in the process, 
deepening and strengthening the bonds of those who are part of it. 
                                                 
104 DAO DECHING, Ch. 57, Sentence 3. 
105 H. PATRICK GLENN, LEGAL TRADITIONS OF THE WORLD 328 (2010). Li is often contrasted with 
fa (法), the formal, codified law regarded in Confucian legal thinking as fixed and inflexible.  
106 Id. at 327. 
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